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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CARRIERS-PERSONAL INJURIES-ESCALATORS AND ELEVATORS-ESCALA-
TORS ARE NOT COMMON CARRIERS IN ILLINOIS.-In the recent case of Tol-
man v. Wieboldt Stores Inc., 38 Ill. 2d 510, 233 N.E.2d 33 (1968), the Illinois
Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether or not the operator of an
escalator was a common carrier.' The Supreme Court, by Justice Solfisburg,
held that the operator of an escalator was not a common carrier and a pas-
senger upon an escalator was no different from an ordinary business invitee.
On November 29, 1960, Mrs. Ida Tolman went shopping in Wieboldt's
Department Store. As she was traveling from the basement to the first floor
by means of an escalator, the heel of her shoe became wedged between the
slats on the step. The spaces between the wooden slats were from three
quarters of an inch to one inch wide and about an inch deep. Upon nearing
the top of the escalator, Mrs. Tolman, realizing her shoe was stuck, gave her
foot a violent jerk to loosen it. Unfortunately, she lost her balance and fell
backward, sustaining severe injuries.
Mrs. Tolman brought suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County and
recovered a $10,000 judgment, after a jury verdict in her favor. The defen-
dant made several post trial motions, among which was a motion for a new
trial on the basis of the admission of certain interrogations. The court de-
nied all motions. The defendant then appealed to the Appellate Court for
the First District, contending there was no evidence that the escalator was
unsafe or that the defendant knew or should have known that it was unsafe.
The Appellate Court reversed, holding that there was no notice to the store
owner of a dangerous condition and thus the verdict should have been
directed for the defendant.2
Mrs. Tolman appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the
defendant was a common carrier and therefore must bear the burden of
showing non-negligence once an injury has occurred. The Supreme Court
reversed in part the Appellate Court, and remanded the case with instruc-
tions to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court
although not agreeing that the plaintiff was on a common carrier held that
she was owed a duty as a business invitee and further held that there was
sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury and that the Appellate Court
erred in entering judgment for the defendant. The court ordered a new
trial, however, because the trial court allowed improper evidence in the
form of interrogatories concerning other accidents which occurred on the
escalator before Wieboldt's became owners of the building.
I In Heffernan v. Mandel Bros. Inc., 297 Il1. App. 272 17 N.E.2d 523 (lst Dist. 1938),
and Mader v. Mandel Bros. Inc., 314 Il. App. 263, 41 N.E.2d 327 (lst Dist. 1942), the
Appellate Court of the First District had held escalators to be common carriers.
2 Tolman v. Wieboldt Stores Inc., 73 Ill. App. 2d 320, 219 N.E.2d 560 (lst Dist. 1966).
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A common carrier is one who as a regular business transports persons
or property from place to place and holds himself out as engaged in such
business.3 Presumably because the common carrier has undertaken the
great responsibility of transporting persons as a business, the courts require
him to exercise the utmost caution, although he does not become the insurer
of his passenger's safety.4 As a practical matter the courts charge a common
carrier with the highest degree of care because he alone is in control of the
instrumentality and the passengers are completely dependent on him.5 The
procedural effect of being a common carrier is to shift the burden of proof
to the common carrier once an injury occurs. The common carrier must
bear the burden of proving non-negligence or else become liable for the
injury.
Traditionally, common carriers have been thought to be operators of
buses, trains, planes and the like. However, in Illinois an elevator has been
held to be a common carrier for the reason that a passenger is in a con-
veyance over which he has no control, and the operator has undertaken the
great responsibility to transport customers from floor to floor. The operators
of such elevators, upon grounds of public policy, are required to exercise
the highest degree of care and diligence. 6
The main Illinois decision illustrative of the principle that escalators
are like elevators and thus common carriers is Heffernan v. Mandel Bros.
Inc.,7 wherein the court reasoned that in both an escalator and elevator a
passenger is powerless to control the mechanism and unable to exercise any
care for his own protection. The rule that the operator of an elevator is a
common carrier has been held to apply to an escalator for three main
reasons: the similarity of an elevator and escalator in function;8 the fact
that in both conveyances the passenger is powerless to control his own fate;9
and, on a purely public policy basis, looking to the fact that all persons
regardless of age, experience, or infirmity were invited to use an escalator. 10
Therefore, for safety reasons, the owners and operators were held to be
common carriers.
Other courts-Colorado," Michigan, 12 and Massachusetts' 3-have dis-
3 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 530 (1939).
4 Prosser, Torts § 34 (3d ed. 1964).
5 The obligations, restrictions, and liabilities with which a common carrier of pas-
sengers is charged are based primarily upon considerations of public policy and arise by
implication of law. 14 Am. Jur. 2d Carriers § 736 (1964).
6 Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill. 430, 59 N.E. 953 (1901).
7 297 I1. App. 272, 17 N.E.2d 523 (1st Dist. 1938).
8 McBride v. May Department Stores Co., 124 Ohio St. 264, 178 N.E. 12 (1938), aff'g,
38 Ohio App. 420, 177 N.E. 733 (1937).
9 Heffernan v. Mandel Bros. Inc., 297 Ill. App. 272, 17 N.E.2d 523 (1st Dist. 1938);
Petrie v. Kaufman & Baer Co., 29 Pa. 211, 139 Ad. 878 (1927).
10 Vandagriff v. J.C. Penney Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 579, 39 Cal. Rpt. 671 (1964).
11 Nettrour v. J.C. Penney, 146 Colo. 150, 360 P.2d 964 (1961).
12 Fuller v. Wurzburg Dry Good Co., 192 Mich. 477, 158 N.W. 94 (1926).
13 Conway v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 255 Mass. 571, 152 N.E. 94 (1926).
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agreed that an escalator is like an elevator. These courts feel that the desig-
nation of escalators as common carriers is not warranted in light of the con-
trol which an escalator passenger can exert over himself while being
transported. The standard of care charged to escalator owners in these cases
is reasonable and ordinary care commensurate with the particular circum-
stances or that required toward any ordinary business invitee.
Obviously, escalators and elevators do not fit the generally given defin-
ition of a common carrier. They do not, as a regular business, undertake for
hire to carry all persons, who may apply for passage, or hold themselves out
as engaged in such business. 14 Also, a contract express or implied is necessary
to the creation of the relationship of a carrier and passenger.15 The escalator
like an elevator is merely furnished to enable persons to shop more easily.
They may aid in profit, but are hardly common carriers in any sense of the
definition. Those courts that hold them to be common carriers are not con-
cerned with how well they fit the definition. They are mainly concerned
with a conveyance which transports human beings in large quantities and
the voluntary assumption of great responsibilites. Only then, for public
policy reasons, have escalators and elevators been charged with the common
carrier standard of care notwithstanding their lack of conformity with the
common carrier definition.
The court in the Tolman case was directly opposed to the rule that an
escalator is like an elevator, thus agreeing with the cases from other juris-
dictions. The court examined the traditional common carriers and the
relationship of passengers to the conveyance. They reasoned that a passenger
on an escalator is not powerless to control himself while being transported,
as he would be while a passenger on a train, bus, elevator, or airplane. It
was felt since escalators differed in this essential factor from common car-
riers they should not be charged with the common carrier standard of care.
Thus, in substitution for the common carrier standard the court adopted
the rule that a passenger on an escalator is no different than any other
customer in a store and entitled to only that care which any other business
invitee would be entitled.'8
The Tolman case implies that the results would be the same under
either the business invitee or the common carrier standard since the business
invitee standard requires that the owner must exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances. Herein the owner is in charge of a potentially
dangerous piece of equipment. Thus reasonable care would have to be a
high degree of care to protect customers from being injured. This implica-
tion may lead one to believe that the chances of holding the owner liable
have not lessened due to the application of the business invitee standard,
14 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 530 (1939).
15 14 Am. Jur. 2d Carriers § 736 (1964).
16 At this point the court cited Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lanes, 5 Ill. 2d 153, 125 N.E2d
47 (1955), which sets out the standard of care for business invitees as being reasonable
care under all the circumstances.
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since in both situations the owner is required to exercise a high degree of
care toward his customers. However, this conclusion is not valid. The same
result may be reached in a case such as Tolman. The court felt that the
evidence was sufficient to show that Wieboldt's, in allowing the old out-
moded escalator with its wide-spaced wooden slats to be used by its cus-
tomers, was negligent. But what will be the result when a passenger on an
escalator is injured by some unexplainable, undiscoverable malfunction?
The main difference between the business invitee standard and the
common carrier standard lies in the burden of proof. Under the common
carrier theory, the mere occurrence of an injury to one being transported by
an escalator was sufficient to raise a prima facie case of negligence. 17 The
establishing of the prima facie case causes the burden of proof to shift to
the common carrier, and requires him to prove non-negligence. If the injury
is caused by some unexplainable malfunction which the carrier himself
cannot explain then he has not carried the burden and remains liable to
the passenger. Under the business invitee standard the results are the op-
posite. The burden of proof always remains with the passenger and no
prima facie case is raised with the mere occurrence of the accident. If the
passenger cannot prove negligence he cannot recover. If the injury was
caused by some unexplainable malfunction, it is unlikely that the defen-
dant will be liable unless the plaintiff is successful under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa loquitur, however, does not cause the burden of
proof to shift. It merely provides an inference of negligence from the fact
that an injury occurred due to an instrumentality under the exclusive con-
trol of the defendant.' 8
If escalators are not considered common carriers and where active
negligence cannot be shown the results will be typically in favor of the de-
fendant. Conway v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. 19 and Fuller v. Wurzburg Dry
Good Co. 20 are two cases illustrating this result. Both cases are from juris-
dictions in which the business invitee standard is used in regard to es-
calators.
In the Conway case, there was an unexplainable movement in the es-
calator hand rail which caused the plaintiff's hand to be caught. The court
stated;
While it is the duty of the defendant to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances to maintain and operate their escalators,
an action based on negligence cannot be maintained unless it is
proved affirmatively that the escalator is in defective condition due
to the act or omission of the defendant.
21
17 Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79, 170 Eng. Rpt. 1088 (1809); Galena and Chicago
Union Ry. Co. v. Yarwood, 15 Ill. 468 (1854).
i8 Prosser, Torts § 40 (3d ed. 1964).
19 255 Mass. 571, 152 N.E. 94 (1926).
20 192 Mich. 477, 158 N.W. 1026 (1916).
21 Supra note 19, at 571, 152 N.E. 94.
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A similar conclusion was reached in the Fuller case where the plaintiff
claimed she was thrown by a peculiar motion of the escalator. The court
ruled that the mere showing of an injury was not enough to infer negligence.
There must be an affirmative showing of negligence or circumstances from
which it may be inferred. It is highly likely, if the language in Tolman is to
be applied, the results of future cases will be much like those reached in the
Conway and Fuller cases where no affirmative showing of negligence can be
made.
MICHAEL D. MARRS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES AND CLASS LEGISLA-
TION-WHETHER SECTION 29 OF THE LIMITATIONS ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.-In
the recent case of Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967),
the Supreme Court of Illinois was confronted with the problem of whether
a 1963 act' of the legislature, which required that a suit arising out of a
defective condition of an improvement to real estate be brought against the
architect within four years after his performance, was constitutionally valid.
The trial court found for the architect and the Illinois Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded, holding that the act was unconstitutional 2 as violative
of Section 22 of Article IV3 of the Illinois Constitution. The court stated
1 I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 24F (1967), provides in its pertinent parts that an action to
recover damages for an injury to property, real or personal, or for the injury to a person,
or for bodily injury or wrongful death arising out of a defective and unsafe condition
of an improvement to real estate,
... [s]hall be brought against any person performing or finishing the design,
planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to
real property, unless such cause of action shall have accrued within four years
after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction ....
Three other states have enacted statutes of a similar nature. The statutes are Michigan
Stat. Ann. 27A.5839 (1967), Nevada Rev. Stat. 11.205 (1957), and Baldwin's Ohio Rev. Code
Ann., Title 2305.131 (1964). So far, the constitutionality of these statutes has not been
contested.
2 The plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision on various grounds and the court
said that Section 29 of the Limitations Act probably violated Section 13 of Article IV of
the Illinois Constitution. Section 13 of Article IV states that every act shall have only one
subject and that one subject has to be expressed in the title. If an act should contain any
subject not expressed in the title, the act shall be void only as to that much not expressed
in the title. Section 29 of the Limitations Act is entitled "An Act in regards to limitations,"
though the Section is not concerned with limitations in the ordinary sense. A statute of
limitations normally governs the time within which a legal proceeding must be instituted
after a cause of action occurs. Section 29 goes further than just limiting the time in which
a suit may be brought; it also bars a cause of action before it occurs. The title of Section
29 does not mention that it bars a cause of action and thus under Section 13 of Article
IV a subject not expressed in the title is void. The plaintiff had not argued this point and
accordingly the court did not rule on it. What in fact is the effect of Section 29 is to
possibly preclude an action before all elements of the tort become present. The damage
may not occur until after the four year period.
S Ill. Const. Act. IV, § 22, provides a list of subjects upon which there shall be no
special legislation, none of which are relevant here. It then concludes with a general pro-
vision that "in all other cases where a general law may be applicable, no special law shall
be enacted."
